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The jurisprudential context
Lego1 gave the European Court of Justice (“the Court”)
a second chance to review the concept of functionality
and in particular the scope of art.7(1)(e)(ii) of the
Community TradeMark Regulation, providing that “signs
which consist exclusively of… the shape of goods which
is necessary to obtain a technical result” shall not be
registered as trade marks. In Philips2 it had considered
the equivalent provision of the Harmonisation Directive,
art.3(1)(e), and ruled that: (i) distinctiveness was
irrelevant for a shape refused registration under
art.3(1)(e), the provision constituted a preliminary
obstacle; (ii) art.3(1)(e)(ii), in particular, covered shapes
whose essential characteristics performed a technical
function; and (iii) the wording of art.3(1)(e)(ii) did not
allow consideration of the existence of alternative shapes.
Embedding trade mark rights against a broader
intellectual-property context the Court noted that the aim
of the provision was not to allow individuals to use trade
mark rights in order to acquire or perpetuate exclusive
rights relating to technical solutions.
The concept of functionality has also provided a
broader interpretive framework. For example in Dyson,3
it contributed in delineating what did not constitute a sign;
A.G. Léger even described the subject matter of the
application as a “functionality”.
Lego’s challenge
Lego (more accurately Kirkbi its predecessor in title) had
managed back in 1996 to obtain registration of its toy
brick (a three-dimensional sign in red) as a Community
trade mark for “games and playthings” in class 28. Ritvik,
the predecessor of Mega Brands, attacked the registration
to the extent it covered “construction toys”. The
Cancellation Division declared the mark invalid on the
basis of art.7(1)(e)(ii) of the Regulation, having found
that each of the elements of the brick (the existence of
the studs, their symmetrical positioning, size, and
cylindrical form, their height in relation to the walls of
the brick, the way the sides could connect to produce a
wall, the hollow skirt that enabled fixing, the overall shape
and size of the brick) and thus the brick as a whole was
necessary to obtain a technical result. Subsequently, the
Board of Appeal (sitting for the first time as a Grand
Board) upheld the decision having itself found that: (i)
surveys were irrelevant for the application of that
provision; (ii) a minor arbitrary element such as colour
should not allow the sign to escape the application of the
provision; and (iii) an earlier patent would not by itself
bar registration but constituted irrefutable evidence that
the features covered by the patent were functional.
The challenge before the General Court focused first
on the relevance of functionally equivalent alternative
shapes using the same technical solution. It upheld the
decision of the Grand Board noting that: (i) “exclusively”
was linked with “essential characteristics which perform
a technical function”, thus the addition of non-essential
characteristics having no technical function did not
prevent the application of art.7(1)(e)(ii) if all the essential
characteristics of that shape performed such a function;
(ii) “necessary to obtain a technical result” did not narrow
the scope of the provision to cases where only the
contested shape could achieve the intended result, it was
sufficient that its essential characteristics combined the
characteristics that were technically causal of, and
sufficient to obtain, the intended technical result, and
were therefore attributable to the technical result; (iii) no
distinction should be made between shapes using another
“technical solution” and shapes using the same “technical
solution”. Lego also targeted the issue of what constituted
an essential characteristic and the assessment of functional
nature. The General Court found that: (iv) the perception
1 Lego Juris A/S v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-48/09 P) Unreported September 14, 2010; Lego Juris A/S v
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (Mega Brands) (T-270/06) [2008] E.C.R. II-3117; Lego Juris A/S v Mega Brands Inc
(R 856/2004-G) [2007] E.T.M.R. 11.
2Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2003] Ch. 159; [2002] E.C.R. I-5475.
3Dyson v Registrar of Trade Marks (C-321/03) [2007] Bus. L.R. 787; [2007] E.C.R. I-687.
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of the targeted consumer audience was not relevant to the
assessment of functionality, what constituted an essential
characteristic had to be determined objectively, on the
basis of the trade mark’s graphic representation and any
descriptions filed at the time of the application; and (v)
however, the Board had the power to consider the
invisible features of the brick and take into account any
other evidence including expert opinions and prior patent
specifications and claims.
Before the Court, Lego argued that: art.7(1)(e)(ii)
covered shapes that would create a monopoly on technical
solutions or on functional characteristics; “essential
characteristics” was synonymous with “dominant and
distinctive elements”, and the identification of those
characteristics should be carried out from the perspective
of the relevant public; and, the assessment of functionality
in an expert opinion should be made by comparing the
relevant characteristics with alternatives.
The Opinion of the Advocate General
Apart from the jurisprudential significance of the case,
there is a human aspect that must be noted. Lego is
marked by the loss of A.G. Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,
an enormously influential figure in the development of
European trade mark law; he passed away on November
11, 2009, the day following the hearing in Lego. His role
in this case was taken over by Paolo Mengozzi and the
published Opinion is attributed to both.
The Opinion viewed trade mark rights as part of a
bigger intellectual-property arsenal, access to which
should be regulated. The provision should be
contextualised against its own legislative framework but
also against a broader picture that comprised other
intellectual-property rights combined with competition
considerations. Putting the emphasis on availability and
competition issues it remarked that art.7(1)(e)(ii) had a
twofold role: preventing a monopoly on technical
solutions through trade mark law and, “keeping separate
trade-mark protection and the protection conferred by
other forms of intellectual property” (point 55).
It also showed a willingness (not foreign in the Court’s
approach to trademark law) to take into account doctrines
developed by non-European courts and a wish to express
a positively formulated view detached from the factual
scenario of the case. The Opinion remarked, as a gentle
criticism of the Court’s approach, that in Philips (a case
in which Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer had the Advocate General
role) it had:
"[E]mphasised the grounds on which it was
appropriate to refuse registration of a mark having
those characteristics, but it scarcely set out for
undertakings the guidelines for registering functional
signs as trade marks … the Court … left [the door]
ajar… and this appeal must determine the size of the
gap."(Point 51)
Philips, according to the Opinion, had introduced an
element of vagueness that could be resolved by
introducing three steps in the application of art.7(1)(e)(ii).
The first step involves the identification of the most
important elements of the shape, with each of the
individual features of the get-up being analysed in turn
followed by an assessment of a necessary connection
between those characteristics and the technical result that
also needs to be defined properly. The functionality of
each element had to be determined separately but there
was a presumption for goods that had enjoyed patent or
design protection that their essential characteristics
performed a technical function, citing the US Supreme
Court in TrafFix.4 If all the essential characteristics of the
shape perform a technical function, the shape itself is
functional.
If not, at the second step we have to choose between
two alternative directions. The first direction restricts the
trade mark right to the essential and distinctive
non-functional elements. The second direction would
have to, “compare the other compatible market options”
(point 74), subject to the requirement that any
industrial-property right granted must not lead to
significant non-reputation related disadvantage for
competitors vis-à-vis their own signs. Alternatives must
be analysed taking into account interoperability and the
requirement of availability, which represent the public
interest behind art.7(1)(e)(ii). The assessment of
distinctiveness is the third step, and here the overall
impression conveyed by the sign, the perspective of the
consumer, and the goods or services included in the
specification regain their relevance.
The Opinion also rejected the distinction between
technical solution and technical result and, focusing again
on the availability requirement, added that functional
shapes may be freely used by all and accordingly the
existence of alternative shapes is irrelevant in assessing
their functionality. Finally, it stressed that the rationale
behind art.7(1)(e) is far removed from the essential
function of the trade mark and the applicability of the
provision had to be ascertained objectively rather than
from the perspective of the average consumer.
The Court of Justice
The public interest
The Court, following the competition and availability
themes set in the Opinion, repeated that the public interest
underlying art.7(1)(e)(ii) is to prevent trade mark law
granting an undertaking amonopoly on technical solutions
or functional characteristics of a product:
"In that connection, the rules laid down by the
legislature reflect the balancing of two
considerations, both of which are likely to help
establish a healthy and fair system of
competition."(Lego at [44])
4 TrafFix Devices Inc v Marketing Displays Inc, 532 US 23 (2001).
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It, too, viewed trade mark rights as part of a broader
scheme of rights and added that the aim was to ensure
that they are not used, “in order to perpetuate, indefinitely,
exclusive rights relating to technical solutions” (Lego at
[45]). Mentioning patented products in particular (Lego
at [46]) it remarked that technical solutions in the
European system of rights are protectable only for a
limited period, so that subsequently they may be freely
used by all economic operators and this consideration
underlies both trade mark and design laws.
The scope of the provision
Accordingly, first, the provisions of art.7(1)(e) were
strictly set and should be interpreted as precluding from
registration even signs that have acquired distinctiveness
as a result of use.
Secondly, the terms “exclusively” and “necessary”
ensure that only shapes of goods that only incorporate a
technical solution, and whose registration as a trade mark
would therefore actually impede the use of that technical
solution by other undertakings, are not to be registered.
In principle, a shape cannot be refused registration
when it incorporates a major non-functional element.
However:
"[T]he presence of one or more minor arbitrary
elements in a three-dimensional sign, all of whose
essential characteristics are dictated by the technical
solution to which that sign gives effect, does not
alter the conclusion that the sign consists exclusively
of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain
a technical result."(Lego at [52])
And “necessary to obtain the technical result” does not
mean that the shape at issue must be the only one capable
of obtaining that result. There may be alternative shapes,
but in itself that does not mean that registering the shape
as a trade mark would have no effect on the availability
of the technical solution. After all, trade mark protection
would also cover similar shapes and this could cover a
significant number of alternative shapes:
"A sign consisting of the shape of a product that,
without the inclusion of significant non-functional
elements, merely performs a technical function
cannot be registered as a trade mark. Such a
registration would unduly impair the opportunity
for competitors to place on the market goods whose
shapes incorporate the same technical
solution."(Lego at [59])
The Court stressed that that applies a fortiori in a case,
such as Lego, where it has been established that the
solution incorporated in the contested shape is the
technically preferable solution. Otherwise it would be
difficult for competitors to come up with shapes
constituting a real alternative: i.e. not similar shapes that
must also be attractive from a functional perspective.
Slavish copies—unfair competition
Nevertheless, the Court added, protection against:
"[C]ompetitors placing on the market slavish copies
of the product shape incorporating exactly the same
solution … can, where appropriate, be examined in
the light of rules on unfair competition."(Lego at
[61])
The identification of essential characteristics
The Court agrees with the Opinion that the expression
“essential characteristics”must be understood as referring
to the most important elements of the sign but fails or
avoids to provide concrete practical guidance. In broad
terms it indicates that identification must be carried out
on a case-by-case basis, without an hierarchy that applies
systematically between the elements of which a signmay
consist, and accepting that the relevant authority may:
"[E]ither base its assessment directly on the overall
impression produced by the sign, or first examine
in turn each of the components of the sign
concerned."(Lego at [70])
Similarly, but at least stating that this would depend
in particular on the degree of difficulty of each case, the
identification may be carried out by means of a simple
visual analysis or require a detailed examination:
"[I]n which relevant criteria of assessment are taken
into account, such as surveys or expert opinions, or
data relating to intellectual property rights conferred
previously in respect of the goods concerned."(Lego
at [71])
Non-functional elements
Once the essential characteristics have been identified it
is still necessary to ascertain whether they all perform the
technical function of the goods at issue:
"Article 7(1)(e)(ii) … cannot be applicable where
the application for registration as a trademark relates
to a shape of goods in which a non-functional
element, such as a decorative or imaginative element,
plays an important role."(Lego at [72])
In that case, according to the Court, competitors would
“easily” have access to alternative shapes with equivalent
functionality and there “there is no risk that the
availability of the technical solution will be impaired”
(Lego at [72]). And in the particular factual context, the
Court accepted the findings and reasoning of the Grand
Board of Appeal and the General Court that with the sole
exception of its colour, all the other elements of the sign
constituted by that brick were functional.
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Average consumer perception
The Court confirms the distinction between the
assessment of distinctiveness and the assessment of
functionality. In the first case, the perception of the target
public must be taken into account however “such an
obligation cannot be imposed” (Lego at [75]) in the
context of functionality:
"The presumed perception of the sign by the average
consumer is not a decisive element when applying
the ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of
Regulation No 40/94, but, at most, may be a relevant
criterion of assessment for the competent authority
when it identifies the essential characteristics of the
sign"(Lego at [76])
Responding to the last point raised by Lego the Court
held that for establishing functionality once the essential
characteristics have been identified, it is only necessary
to assess whether those characteristics perform the
technical function of the product concerned:
"Clearly, that examination must be carried out by
analysing the sign filed with a view to its registration
as a trade mark, and not signs consisting of other
shapes of goods."(Lego at [84])
And documents relating to previous patents may be part
of the evidence that is taken into account.
A first assessment of Lego
Lego re-establishes the clear principles set by the Court
in Philips. It positions trade marks against a broader
scheme of intellectual-property rights and in a context of
healthy and fair competition. The Court correctly avoids
burdening trade mark authorities with competition
questions and instead attempts to internalise competition
issues within the public interest behind the specific
functionality provisions. It also avoids taking a doctrinal
stance towards on trumping of trade mark rights by patent
or design rights.
And despite the fact that the factual context is
imperative in the application of trade mark law the Court
attempts to disentangle principles from facts.What it fails
to do is provide a clear multi-factor test for establishing
functionality in an objective way; an example is its
vagueness regarding the role of the target consumer in
this process. However, this was a case that came before
the Court in its capacity as the ultimate court of appeal
rather as an interpretive court. Accordingly, it has to be
read in the light of the contested decisions of the Grand
Board of Appeal and the General Court.
From an interpretive perspective it appears that what
will become critical in functionality cases is the
identification of essential characteristics. It is most likely
that future cases will focus on the determination of the
essential characteristics of a shape, with applicants trying
to argue that not all the essential characteristics are
functional or that there is even a single essential
characteristic that is non-functional and brings a shape
outside the scope of the functionality provisions. Would
a disclaimer in respect of the functional elements support
an application for registration? At a national level the
relationship and balancing between protection against
unfair competition and registered trade mark protection
in relation to “slavish imitations” of functional get up is
expected to gain resonance.
Poland: Are the Designs
within an Ice-Cream to
be Registered as an
Industrial Design?
Judgment of the Supreme
Administrative Court of March
20, 2007, Case Reference No II
GSK 276/06, Przedsiebiorstwo
Produkcji Lodów "Koral” JK
General Partnership in
Limanowa against the Patent
Office of the Republic of Poland
Dr Krystian Maciaszek
The question in issue was whether characteristic features
of the industrial design should be visible at the time of
purchasing a product. The industrial design was in the
form of an ice-cream, whose important features consisted
of the inner arrangement of filling layers that were visible
only when eating the ice–cream. The decision, therefore,
touches upon a significant issue: whether the appearance
of a product should be available to the informed user and
whether the features of a product invisible at the time of
purchase should be protected as industrial design. The
decision also contained brief commentary on the specific
Polish institution of industrial design forms.
Facts of the case
The case concerned the claimant’s right to cancel an
industrial design entitled “Extruded two-flavoured ice
cream with filling”. The design was characterised by a
ball-shaped uncut solid containing filling surrounded by
two layers of ice-creammass of different flavours. On its
external surface there was a crust layer of nut or coconut,
cocoa, chocolate, confectionery, sundae, sesame, coconut
and chocolate, or sunflower seed (design forms are shown
in the figure below).
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